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Francis Ford Coppola’s Apocalypse Now3 is a powerful film full of many gripping
scenes. Since its release in 1979, the movie has provided viewers not only with haunting images
of the Vietnam War, but also with a story that has a great deal to say about human nature and the
nature of violent conflict. In its own way, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Stenberg v. Carhart4
tells an equally gripping story. Unfortunately, the case is not a work of fiction, but a declaration
of what our Constitution demands. Moreover, unlike Coppola’s graphic depiction of war, the
majority’s depiction of partial birth abortion in Stenberg is deliberately understated. Despite
these apparent dissimilarities, the movie – and one scene in particular – serves as a poignant
commentary on Stenberg and, by extension, the future of American law.
Apocalypse Now is largely based on Joseph Conrad’s short novel, Heart of Darkness.5 In
the film, Martin Sheen plays Captain Benjamin Willard, a Special Forces officer ordered to
assassinate Colonel Walter Kurtz, a renegade American played by Marlon Brando. Confronting
the brutal truth of their command – the murder of a fellow American soldier – requires an
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honesty that Willard’s superiors cannot muster. Thus, they do not directly tell Willard to “kill
Colonel Kurtz.” Instead, in the sanitized jargon of military operations, Willard is ordered to
“terminate the Colonel’s command.” Indeed, the CIA case worker present at Willard’s briefing
tells him “Terminate with extreme prejudice.”
To find Kurtz and carry out his mission, Willard is ferried up the Nung River to
Cambodia on a Navy Swift boat manned by a crew of four. At one point on their journey, the
men stop the boat and rest for a while along the river bank. “Chef,” a cook who serves as the
boat’s machinist, goes into the jungle in search of mangoes, accompanied by Willard. As they
make their way into the bush, Chef explains how a man trained as a saucierè in New Orleans
came to work as a machinist. Their friendly banter suddenly ends, however, as Willard hears
something, tenses up and moves forward, pointing his M-16 in the direction of the sound.
Willard’s quiet intensity frightens Chef. It might be “Charlie” lurking in the bush, waiting to
ambush them. They stop, pause, a shadow moves, and a tiger bounds out of the jungle. The two
men fire their weapons and Chef yells in terror as they run back to the boat. They jump on board
and the boat races away, firing its guns into the jungle. Overwhelmed by the incident, Chef
becomes hysterical. Not only must the men contend with the constant threat of death by the Viet
Cong, but as Chef exclaims “I almost got eaten by a fucking tiger!” He screams at the top of his
lungs, “Never get out’a the fucking boat! I gotta remember, never get out’a the fucking boat!”
In a voice-over, Willard – a man trained in the art of killing, a man who knows the jungle –
expresses his agreement: “Never get out’a the boat. Absolutely god damn right . . . Unless you
were going all the way.”
In this scene, the boat and the jungle are not only places where the drama unfolds. They
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also function as metaphors for, respectively, a society in which human conduct is bound by the
limits of moral restraint, and a place which has no such limitations.

That is, not unlike the

Pequod in Melville’s Moby Dick,6 the patrol boat in Apocalypse Now represents civilization.
Compared to the near total insanity and chaos of the wider conflict around them, the boat offers
its crew and passenger a place of relative safety. On the boat the men eat and sleep and smoke
together. They answer their mail and brush their teeth. Although the strictures of military
discipline are somewhat lax, on the boat the men can protect themselves from the dangers of a
hostile world. Indeed, in maintaining the rationality and order necessary to survive “the Shit” of
Vietnam, the boatmates share a common fate.
To get off the boat is to abandon civilization and with it the moral order that makes social
life possible. To get off the boat and venture into the jungle is to leave behind the norms of civil
society and enter a place where violence is neither right or wrong, only “necessary.” It is a place
beyond good and evil, where freedom knows no bounds. Without the constraints and security
provided by social custom and the protection afforded by law, one must be willing to suspend
one’s moral judgment and go “all the way.” That is, one must have the will to do what others
cannot bring themselves to do. One must have the strength to act like the Viet Cong who, as
Kurtz later recounts, hacked off the little arms of all the children in a village simply because the
Americans had inoculated them against polio. A man who gets off the boat and ventures into the
jungle must, as Kurtz says, be able “to kill without feeling, without passion, without judgment,
without judgment, because it is judgment that defeats us.” No longer encumbered by the moral
judgments of civilization, which temper the exercise of individual will, one is free to act in any
6
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way deemed desirable.
“Never get out’a the fucking boat.” Sound advice, not only for Swift boat grunts tempted
to venture out into the jungle, but also for federal judges and elected officials, indeed, for
anyone who hopes to live in a society in which the dignity of the human person is respected and
ordered liberty is preserved.
In Stenberg v. Carhart the Supreme Court “got out’a the fucking boat” and showed that it
was willing to go “all the way.” All the way to declaring that the State may not protect a child in
the process of being born.7 All the way to saying that what is indisputably a human being does
not, under the Constitution, enjoy the benefit of law.8 All the way to the brink of infanticide.9
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determined by her doctor)”); Id. at __ (Straub, J. dissenting)(“I find the current expansion of the right to
terminate a pregnancy to cover a child in the process of being born morally, ethically, and legally
unacceptable”); James Bopp, Jr. & Curtis R. Cook, Partial Birth Abortion: The Final Frontier of
Abortion Jurisprudence, 14 Issues L. & Med. 3, 4 (1998)( “Partial-birth abortion is the final frontier of
abortion jurisprudence because it involves the killing of the child during birth.”). Citing the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Executive Board, Statement on Intact Dilation and Extraction
(Jan. 12, 1997), the Supreme Court said: “The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
describes the D & X procedure [partial-birth abortion] in a manner corresponding to a breech-conversion
intact D & E, including the following steps:
“1. deliberate dilation of the cervix, usually over a sequence of days;
“2. instrumental conversion of the fetus to a footling breech;
“3. breech extraction of the body excepting the head; and
“4. partial evacuation of the intracranial contents of a living fetus to effect vaginal delivery of a dead but
otherwise intact fetus.” Id. at 928. It concluded that “[d]espite the technical differences …, intact D & E
and D & X [abortion methods] are sufficiently similar for us to use the terms interchangeably.” Stenberg,
supra at 928.
8

See generally Kathleen A. Cassidy Goodman, The Mutation of Choice, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 635,
661 (1997) (“Partial-birth abortion must be viewed not only as a morally questionable practice in the
already controversial realm of abortion, but also as an indicator of the direction the United States is
moving with regard to respect for all human life”); and Stephanie D. Schmutz, Infanticide or Civil Rights
for Women: Did the Supreme Court Go Too Far in Stenberg v. Carhart, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 529, 531

4

Of course, the Supreme Court does not say this directly. Because the majority recognizes
the sheer barbarism of what they say the Constitution requires,10 they are unwilling to express
themselves with genuine candor. Instead, like Captain Willard’s superiors, the Stenberg court
articulates its decision in language that conceals the true nature of the conduct involved, making
it morally palatable to those who like to think of themselves as members of civilized society.
But all of this is subterfuge. Behind the cloak of polite verbiage Willard’s superiors are ordering
him to kill Kurtz by any means necessary, and the Supreme Court is declaring that the

(2002) (“The gruesome detail with which this law describes the procedure it restricts indicates just how
far we have denigrated the rights of unborn children”).
9

Some have argued that partial birth abortion should not fall within the Court’s abortion
jurisprudence since it involves the killing (infanticide) of a partially birthed human baby. See e.g., James
Bopp, Jr. & Curtis R. Cook, Partial Birth Abortion: The Final Frontier of Abortion Jurisprudence, 14
ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 32 (1998)( The partial-birth extraction and cranial decompression procedure
constitutes infanticide and is not governed by abortion jurisprudence”). “[T]he abortion right applies only
to those who are unborn. A baby who is partially delivered cannot properly be termed unborn. In the
partial-birth abortion procedure as described by practitioners, the baby is three-fourths delivered. Only
three inches of the baby could arguably be said to be unborn. The baby as a whole is partially-born, not
unborn. As a result, abortion jurisprudence does not apply to a partially delivered child.” Id. at 26. See
also National Abortion Federation v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278, __ (2d Cir. 2006)(Straub, J. dissenting)(“In
addition to vindicating the right to life of those in the process of being born, the State has a compelling
interest in protecting the line between abortion and infanticide”); Jill R. Radloff, Partial-Birth Infanticide:
An Alternate Legal and Medical Route to Banning Partial-Birth Procedures, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1555,
1557 (1999)(arguing that partial-birth infanticide is an accurate description of what is commonly called
partial-birth abortion because “the child dies during the birth process”); and Steven Grasz, If Standing
Bear Could Talk … Why There is No Constitutional Right to Kill a Partially-Born Human Being, 33
CREIGHTON L. REV. 23, 26 (1999)(“partial-birth abortion cases can, and should, be decided outside the
legal framework of Roe and its progeny”). But see Eric Johnson, Habit and Discernment in Abortion
Practice: The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 as Moral Legislation, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 549
(2005)(While “it is true that to the layperson dilation and extraction bears a close resemblance to
infanticide … physicians need not and probably will not perceive dilation and extraction as closely
resembling infanticide, [therefore] there is no good reason to suppose that their use of this technique
ultimately will prevent them from acquiring or maintaining a habit of respect for persons”).
10

E.g., Carhart, supra at 946 (Stevens, J. concurring)(“Although much ink is spilled today
describing the gruesome nature of late-term abortion procedures, that rhetoric does not provide me a
reason to believe that the procedure Nebraska here claims it seeks to ban is more brutal, more gruesome,
or less respectful of ‘potential life’ than” many other abortion methods”).

5

Constitution forbids the States from banning a practice in which a child, who is within inches of
being fully born, can have its skull split open by a pair of scissors and its brains sucked out by a
vacuum.
At the beginning of his majority opinion in Stenberg, Justice Stephen Breyer notes that
the act of abortion can be described in disparate ways. He acknowledges that some people
believe that the abortion license is necessary to ensure the “equal liberty” of American women,
while others hold that “an abortion is akin to causing the death of an innocent child.”11 Even
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Carhart, supra at 920. The Second Circuit recently echoed Breyer’s observation regarding the
disparate views held concerning abortion: See National Abortion Federation v. Gonzales, 437 F3d 278,
__ (2d Cir. 2006) (“Some consider abortion the illegitimate killing of a person. Others consider abortion a
legitimate medical procedure used by a pregnant woman, in consultation with her doctor, to terminate a
pregnancy prior to birth. Those on both sides of the controversy acknowledge that the fetus is a living
organism, starting as a collection of cells just after conception and developing into a recognizable human
form as the time for birth approaches. The destruction of a fetus is a distressing event, whether one views
abortion as the killing of a person or a pregnant woman's personal choice concerning her body.”).
Justice Breyer considers these views “virtually irreconcilable.” Carhart, supra at 920. If by this
he means that each side in the abortion debate has strongly held views and that neither side is likely to
alter its perspective, he may well be right. As a logical matter, however, the two views are not mutually
exclusive. That is, it may well be the case both that the abortion license gives women greater freedom to
direct their lives than they would have if it was not available and that the abortion procedure causes the
death of an innocent child. There is no formal contradiction in these two claims.
Those who once held that the earth was flat and those who held that the earth was round held
mutually exclusive views. The law of the excluded middle precludes the possibility of the earth being
both round and flat in the same way at the same time. But those who contended that the South needed
slavery to compete on equal footing with the North and those who believed in the dignity of all persons,
including enslaved African-Americans, did not hold “virtually irreconcilable” views. In the first case, the
flat earther’s were proved wrong. In the second case, whether the equality proposition was true or false,
the United States decided to subordinate the economic equality claim in favor of the liberty claim.
In the abortion context, social critic Naomi Wolf reconciles Breyer’s “virtually irreconcilable”
positions by subordinating the life of the unborn child in favor of women’s equality. She calls for prochoice advocates to stop “entang[ing] our beliefs in a series of self-delusions, fibs and evasions.” Naomi
Wolf, Our Bodies, Our Souls, THE NEW REPUBLIC, October 16, 1995, at 26. She argues for
“contextualiz[ing] the fight to defend abortion rights within a moral framework that admits that the death
of a fetus is a real death.” Id. She goes on to say that “[f]ree women must be strong women, too; and
strong women, presumably, do not seek to cloak their most important decisions in euphemism.” Id. at 32.
For Wolf, the exercise of power must be accompanied by an honest recognition of what that power
accomplishes. Thus, although she maintains “that a woman’s equality in society must give her some
irreducible rights unique to her biology, including the right to take the life within her” she insists that “we
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here, however, Breyer finds it difficult to state the pro-life position in unvarnished form.
Opponents of abortion do not believe that the act is merely akin to causing the death of an
innocent child but that it is the deliberate and intentional killing of an innocent child. Regardless
of the specific articulation, it seems that for Breyer such description is merely rhetorical gloss.
He gives no indication that there is any truth beyond the political preference for or against
abortion that would support or refute such a description.12 There is only the “truth” constructed
by the Court according to which abortion is a constitutional right, a right that the Court “has
determined and then redetermined” in the course of a generation,13 first in Roe v. Wade14 and
later in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.15 Thus, in giving constitutional sanction to partial birth
abortion, the Stenberg court does not bother to deny that the subject of this gruesome procedure
is in fact a human life, a human being, a child in the process of being born. Indeed the unspoken
premise upon which the Stenberg decision turns is that the humanity or inhumanity of the entity
aborted is irrelevant to the constitutionality of the act. Apparently, like Willard’s commanders,
Breyer believes that some things are better left unsaid.16
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Unable to make the argument that a healthy six, seven, eight, or nine-month-old fetus
subject to partial birth abortion is not a human being, the Court likewise finds itself unable to tell
the American public that the question of the fetus’ humanity is irrelevant to the issue of whether
or not the State may ban the procedure. Instead, the Court avoids the embarrassment of such a
failed argument by ignoring the issue altogether. In doing so, it employs a strategy reserved for
those privileged institutions that have the final say with respect to a given matter. As Justice
Robert Jackson famously observed, the members of the Court “are not final because we are
infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”17 The Stenberg decision not only
manifests the Court’s fallibility,18 it also exposes the folly of any institution that would hope to
resolve such a sensitive and divisive issue without having “the courage to look the truth in the

the fact that a partially delivered baby is indeed a human person. Deep in the jungle, the Court could
openly acknowledge the partially delivered child’s humanity and still license others “to kill … without
judgment, without judgment, because it is judgment that defeats us.” At the edge of the jungle, the Court
must still act in a strategic fashion, sparing in its use of candor.
In 1970 the California Medical Association predicted the need for precisely this strategy in order
to secure wide-spread acceptance of the abortion license. In an editorial in its magazine, the Association
argued that “semantic gymnastics” would need to be employed to avoid “the scientific fact, which
everyone already knows, that human life begins at conception and is continuous whether intra or extra
uterine until death.” The medical profession must deny what it referred to as “the undeniable fact of the
fetus’ humanity” until such time as society would accept abortion without judgment. Such obfuscation
would be necessary in order “to separate the idea of abortion from the idea of killing.” A New Ethic for
Medicine and Society, CAL. MED., Sept. 1970, 67, 67-68.
17

Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).

18

On the potential fallibility of a court vested with final authority, see e.g., Jack Wade Nowlin,
Constitutional Violations by the United States Supreme Court: Analytical Foundations, 2005 U. ILL.
L.REV. 1123, 1196 (2005)(“the concept of constitutional violations by the Supreme Court has significant
support as a matter of analytic jurisprudence and constitutional analysis”). Questioning Supreme Court
finality or supremacy, see e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of
Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals From the Twenty-First Century, 59 ALB. L. REV.
671, 691 (1995)(arguing that “[i]t is time to explode the myth of judicial supremacy and judicial
exclusivity in constitutional interpretation -- a myth that has lived long but ought not be allowed to
prosper,” Paulsen offers four proposals for reform).

8

eye and call things by their proper name.”19
Unfortunately, the Court does more than fail to call things by their proper name. Like
Willard’s commanders, the Stenberg majority hides behind a rhetoric which is intended to strike
the reader as neutral and unobjectionable. Indeed, the Court claims that “[t]here is no alternative
way,” that such language is necessary “to acquaint the reader with the technical distinctions
among different abortion methods and related factual matters.”20 Thus, the Court is able to
describe an innocuous medical procedure in which “the doctor pulls the fetal body through the
cervix, collapses the skull, and extracts the fetus through the cervix.”21 Clearly, the humanity of
the victim of this procedure is not among the “factual matters” addressed by the Court. By not
judging the matter, the Court hopes to finally resolve it.
As such, Kurtz’s prescription for victory in war aptly describes the Court’s decision in
the case. Indeed, it is an epithet for the morbid liberalism that currently defines the Court’s
jurisprudence. In Stenberg the Court takes decisive action, but “without judgment, without
judgment, because it is judgment that defeats us.” The Court does not pause to consider the
status of the child struggling to be born, victimized by the procedure it approves. Without
judgment the Court is free to act. The irony cannot help but appeal to post-modern sensibilities.
By not judging, the judges judge in favor of a virulent tolerance. Put another way, the majority
has decided that in order to preserve the liberty that defines American civilization, the law must
ensure that women are free to act with extreme prejudice toward children in the process of being
19
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born. The absence of judgment in Stenberg has been replicated by virtually every federal court
to consider a subsequent state restriction on partial birth abortion.22 Indeed, the nearly lockstep
fashion in which federal courts have struck down these statutes shows that, notwithstanding all
their vaunted independence, judges with life tenure no less than soldiers can follow the orders of
their superiors without question, without judgment. Of course, some might argue that curtailing
if not entirely eliminating the judgment of lower courts is precisely the point of stare decisis.
Respect for established precedent and settled legal principle guarantees continuity and thus
stability in the legal system in much the same way that the chain of command prevents enlisted
men and officers of lower rank from second-guessing the military plans formulated by their
superiors. Still, as important as the chain of command is, it cannot excuse or legitimate acts of
barbarism.23 It cannot prevent even the lowliest front-line conscript from recognizing the
humanity of a non-combatant and refusing to obey an order that directly targets innocent human
life.24
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down Virginia statute); Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Attorney General of State of New
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How a lower court judge should resolve the conflict between her duty as a judge to apply the
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Even in times of war, civilization is not without its defenders. In 2003, Congress passed
and President Bush signed a federal ban on partial birth abortion.25 The statute was immediately
challenged by advocates of the procedure in three federal actions filed in New York, San
Francisco and Omaha. The district court in each of these lawsuits ruled that the federal statute,
like its state counterparts, violated the constitutional freedom set forth in Stenberg.26 The Second,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal have in turn affirmed each of these respective
decisions.27 To date, every court to consider the matter found that the statute was deficient
because it lacked a “health” exception that would allow the procedure where, in the language of
Casey, it was deemed “necessary, in appropriate medical judgment for the preservation of the life

§894. A soldier may, however, disobey an order by his or her superior to murder non-combatants because
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Ban Act of 2003: The Congressional Reaction to Stenberg v. Carhart, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y
603 (2002-2003)(arguing that the Act is unconstitutional); Tamara F. Kushnir, It’s My Body, It’s My
Choice: The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1117 (2004)(same). Others
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or health of the mother.”28 Although these words sound like words of limitation, from the
beginning of its abortion jurisprudence, the Court has given the term “health” an exceedingly
broad reading. Indeed, in Doe v. Bolton, the companion case to Roe, the Court defined “health”
to mean “all factors - - physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age - relevant to the well-being of the patient.”29
It is this nearly boundless understanding of “health” coupled with a woman’s inviolable
desire to obtain an abortion that allows the Court to go “all the way.” Indeed, it mandates the
result in Stenberg. Thus, it is hard to take issue with Justice Antonin Scalia’s conclusion that
Stenberg is not “a regrettable misapplication of Casey” but the “logical and entirely predictable
consequence” of that decision.30
Notwithstanding the rhetoric of “health” and the Stenberg court’s calculated efforts to
understate the sheer horror of what it approves, some people can still read a map. Some people
know when they’ve gone overboard. Some people can look at their surroundings and know in an
instant that they have left civilization behind and are now heading deep into the jungle. After
reviewing all the evidence in the New York lawsuit challenging the federal statute, District Judge
Richard Casey concluded that partial birth abortion, “is a gruesome, brutal, barbaric, and
uncivilized medical procedure.”31
28
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in the context of mental health, see Brian D. Wassom, The Exception that Swallowed the Rule?:
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Recognition of this fact would cause most people to run out of the jungle and climb back
on board the boat as fast as they can. But “health” gets in the way. Indeed, health as “wellbeing” makes the retreat back to civilization exceedingly difficult. In the bizarre world created
by Stenberg, the Constitution demands that the state not interfere with the “gruesome, brutal,
barbaric, and uncivilized” acts that are “necessary” to kill a child in the process of being born.
After all, the emotional, psychological, or familial “well-being” of a woman may dictate that she
be able to choose the method of her child’s execution. She may wish to be reassured that her
baby will die quickly and without pain, or that her abortion will be conducted in such as way as
to eliminate the possibility of a live birth, or simply in order to please the doctor whom she
trusts, the doctor who simply wants to avoid any “unnecessary complications.” The point is that
“well-being” is broad enough to encompass all of these sorts of considerations, as well as
countless others. As such, “health” is no longer firmly rooted in medical science. It is now a
word that artfully conceals the exercise of power “without judgment, without judgment.”

* * *
Later in the film, the boat and its crew make their way up the river, and Willard
eventually locates Colonel Kurtz. He discovers, however, that Kurtz is truly insane. As Willard
remarks, “Kurtz got off the boat” and “split from the whole fucking program.” The rotting
corpses and severed heads that decorate his compound testify to this fact. But it is not an
insanity derived from the absence of any rationality. Instead, Kurtz’s insanity is the result of
subscribing to two contradictory rationalities simultaneously. In the film, this contradiction is
presented as the paradox of war: To save civilization man must abandon the moral limits of
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human conduct and act with brutal savagery. For Coppola, however, this is no paradox, only
perverse absurdity. Indeed, the absurd way in which the war is conducted is a recurring theme
throughout the film: The Armed Forces Radio tells nineteen-year-old GI’s trained to kill that the
mayor of Saigon wants them to hang their laundry up “indoors instead of off the window sills” in
order to “keep Saigon beautiful!”; military commanders fly three Playboy centerfolds into the
middle of the jungle to dance for the troops and are surprised to find that the boys want to storm
the stage; an Army chaplain and a few soldiers celebrate mass on a smoke-filled landing zone as
a tank flame–thrower torches an enemy bunker; and one American officer, obsessed with
catching the perfect wave in Vietnam, has his soldiers surf as enemy rounds explode around
them.
Early in the film we are told that Kurtz was “a good man . . . a humanitarian man, a man
of wit and humor.” But it is this absurd juxtaposition of civilization and war, of moral order and
immoral violence, of the desire to protect life and the utter disregard for life that drives Kurtz
insane. As Kurtz says moments before Willard kills him: “They train young men to drop fire on
people, but their commanders won’t allow them to write ‘Fuck’ on their airplanes because it’s
obscene!” For Kurtz the contradiction is unbearable. It causes him to collapse from the inside.
As Willard puts it, Kurtz first broke from his superiors “and then he broke from himself. I’ve
never seen a man so broken up and ripped apart.”
The law suffers a similar collapse when it embraces two contradictory principles, two
competing rationalities that cannot be reconciled with one another. Stenberg constitutionalized
this kind of insanity, injecting it into our fundamental law by elevating an extreme conception
freedom above the obligation to treat every human being as a subject deserving of equal concern
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and respect. In doing so, the Court lifted human liberty to unnatural heights while
simultaneously destroying its foundation. Indeed, the Court reasoned that to preserve the equal
dignity of women in society it is necessary to abandon the moral limits of human freedom.
Respect for women’s autonomy requires thatthe state not intervene when a child in the process
of being born is met with brutal savagery. In both an immediate and in an ultimate sense,
however, the dignity and liberty of one individual cannot rest firmly on the right to destroy
another innocent human being. Thus, by embracing an exaggerated understanding of human
freedom, the Court corrupted the very notion equal dignity and respect and laid clear the path
into the jungle.
To be sure, liberty and equality are two principles, two rationalities that must be
embodied in law. Indeed, each of these principles constitutes an indispensable aspect of human
dignity such that each is necessary to safeguard that dignity in the legal and political order. At
the same time, however, as commentators from Plato to de Tocqueville have observed, liberty
and equality stand somewhat in tension with one another.32 Taken to an extreme, the principle of
equality subverts liberty, and the principle of liberty undermines equality. That is, if equality is
not limited to formal equality before the law but is broadened to include equality of condition,
then individuals may no longer distinguish themselves through the free exercise of their talents
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and resources. Similarly, unbounded liberty not only exacerbates the natural differences that
exist among individuals, if left unchecked, it renders even formal legal equality chimerical. The
true dignity of the human person instead requires a proper ordering, a kind of equilibrium
between these two competing principles.
Throughout most of our modern constitutional history, the Supreme Court has preserved
a balance between liberty and equality. The Court has allowed Congress and the states to ensure
some basic level of equality of condition through the provision of public services and social
insurance benefits. In construing the meaning of equality under the Constitution, however, the
Supreme Court has not insisted on equality of condition or equality of outcome. Instead, the
Court has largely limited its interpretation to formal legal equality. This understanding of
equality requires public authorities to treat all individuals with equal concern and respect simply
by virtue of their status as human beings, and nothing more.33 Thus, in what is undoubtedly the
modern Court’s most celebrated decision, Brown v. Board of Education, the Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the government from
segregating children in public schools on the basis of race. To do so would violate their inherent
dignity.34
Beyond the field of public education, this same concern for formal legal equality has
33
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informed the Court’s decisions in a variety of other areas. These areas include the right to vote,35
the composition of civil and criminal juries,36 the right to marry37 and the disposition of
property.38
The duty to treat all human beings with equality, that is, as subjects worthy of equal
concern and respect, does not require the state to treat every individual exactly alike in every
way. Indeed, the state has “a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups
of citizens differently from others.”39 Rather, the state violates the principle of legal equality
when its classification of human beings “rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement
of the State’s objective.”40 Thus, for example, the government may not deny admission to a
state-sponsored university on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion or gender.41 It may, however,
restrict admission on the basis of perceived intelligence and aptitude for study.42 By contrast,
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however, the government may not limit or enhance an individual’s right to free speech, or
freedom of religion, or due process based on perceived intelligence. Because they protect
fundamental aspects of human dignity, the state may not choose to dispense these rights in any
manner it sees fit and remain faithful to the principle of equality. As a subject of equal concern
and respect by virtue of his or her humanity, every human being is entitled to the enjoyment of
these rights.
Similarly, in construing the principle of liberty, as a general matter, the Court has not
viewed the law as an instrument of radical, individual autonomy. Indeed, in setting forth the
meaning of “freedom under law” the Court has not been guided by the extreme view of liberty as
license so much as a concern for ordered liberty.43 Thus, although the Court has typically
interpreted the various individual rights granted under the Constitution in a generous and
expansive manner, the Court has also found that these rights are subject to reasonable limitations
required by the common good.
For example, although the Court has found that a competent adult may refuse to receive
medical treatment,44 an individual may not decline to be vaccinated against a communicable
disease that poses a risk to the public health.45 Parents have the right to raise their children and
educate them as they see fit,46 but this right of family autonomy does not include the right to
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neglect children in their upbringing or engage in child abuse.47 Individuals have the right to
freely practice the religion of their choice, and the state may not question the truth of any
particular theological tenet to which they subscribe, but this freedom is not unbounded. The
state may prohibit even sincere religious adherents from engaging in acts barred by laws of
general applicability.48 Likewise, individuals may own, use, and dispose of property as they see
fit, but the government may control the use of property through zoning restrictions, the provision
of rights of access and environmental regulations, and the designation of landmark status.49
Indeed, an individual has no right to have a racially restrictive covenant enforced by the state in a
real estate transaction.50
Even the right to free speech, perhaps the broadest and most cherished liberty guaranteed
by the Constitution, is limited by the principle of harm to others. This harm may take the form
of reputational, psychological, or physical injury. Thus, for example, the state may, consistent
with the First Amendment, allow a private litigant to sue for damages for speech that constitutes
libel.51 Likewise, the government may ban the creation and distribution of child pornography,
precisely because of the severe harm inflicted on the children depicted in such materials.52
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the state may prohibit and punish speech that is designed
to incite violence against others.53 That is, notwithstanding the express constitutional guarantee
of free speech, a state may criminally punish advocacy speech that is intended to incite and likely
to produce “imminent lawless action,”54 as well as “fighting words” directed toward a specific
individual and likely to provoke a violent response.55
There is no constitutional provision that expressly guarantees the right to abortion,56 yet
the Court has fashioned a right that far exceeds the boundaries of express guarantee of free
speech.57 Indeed, Stenberg constitutionalized a right to violence, a right to harm another human
being in the most gruesome way imaginable. In its First Amendment jurisprudence, the Court
permits the state to curtail speech because of the state’s even more basic interest in curtailing the
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possibility of violence.58 The violence in partial birth abortion is no mere possibility. It is a
deadly certainty. Nevertheless, in Stenberg the Court held that the state may not act to prevent
the extermination of a human life, a human being, a child in the process of being born, all in the
name of freedom.
The Court is able to ignore this violence because, in the case of abortion, it has
abandoned the idea of ordered liberty in favor of a maximal conception of human freedom. As
the Court noted in Wisconsin v. Yoder, “the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing
every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has
important interests.”59 Yet this is precisely the kind of liberty – the freedom to make one’s own
standards on matters of life and death, the freedom to kill a child in the process of being born –
that the Court embraces in Stenberg. Although this understanding of freedom can be found
throughout the Court’s abortion jurisprudence, it is most clearly stated in Casey’s now famous
mystery passage: “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”60 Although much maligned by
those critical of the result in Casey, the passage is not without some merit. A society that values
freedom will not want its government to supply all of the answers to life’s questions. Indeed, a
free society will, within the bounds of ordered liberty, welcome a plurality of responses to the
58
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question of value, the question of what kind of life is truly worth living.
At the same time, the freedom to define the “mystery of human life” celebrated in Casey
cannot include the facts of human life, and ordered liberty does not require the government to
remain silent and inactive with respect to these facts. The scientific fact of when human life
begins – when a human life begins – has not been in doubt since the advent of the modern study
of human reproduction. As Keith L. Moore succinctly states in his standard medical text on
embryology: “Development begins at fertilization when a sperm fuses with an ovum to form a
zygote . . . The zygote is the first cell of a new human being.”61 This new human life exhibits a
radical discontinuity with the gametes that joined to form it, and with each of its parents. It is
not a “part” of either its mother or its father. Instead, it possesses the genetic constitution,
functional integration and material continuity of a distinct, new, human organism. Moreover, it
will manifest this identity, its identity, the identity of a human being throughout each stage of its
development as an embryo, fetus, infant, child, adolescent and adult. These basic facts of
biology were well-known in 1973 when Roe was decided. They were true then, and they remain
true today.
Justice Harry Blackmun, the author of Roe, recognized that neither the American public
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nor the logic of American law would accept an opinion that, on the one hand, recognized the
humanity of the unborn child and, on the other hand, the right to kill such a human being.62
Because there was no genuine dispute with respect to the science of when human life begins, in
order to vindicate the right to abortion, the Roe court was compelled to invent a controversy
where none in fact existed. Thus, the Court referred to “the theory that a new human life is
present from the moment of conception”63 and “the belief that life begins at conception.”64
Although Blackmun makes frequent mention of “potential life,”65 “potential human life,”66 and
“the potentiality of human life,”67 he deliberately avoids engaging the medical literature that
addresses the question of when a human being first comes into existence. Blackmun knew well
the lesson that Breyer would later follow: Some things really are better left unsaid.
Blackmun’s reticence was, however, quite selective. Despite the felt need to provide a
seemingly comprehensive history of abortion from antiquity to the present68 in an opinion
exceeding fifty pages, Blackmun was content to make a single, oblique reference to “the well-
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known facts of fetal development”69 without elaboration. These facts, it seems, were so wellknown they could safely be ignored.
Having established the existence of a dispute, at least rhetorically, it then suited
Blackmun’s purposes to declare the matter insoluble: “We need not resolve the difficult question
of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy,
and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development
of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.”70 Of course, it would not
have been necessary “to speculate as to the answer” of when human life begins had the Court
bothered to consult “those trained in the . . . discipline[] of medicine.” The Court failed to do
precisely that. Instead, Blackmun’s only reference to the medical profession is a skewed history
of the American Medical Association’s policy with respect to the permissibility of abortion.
That is, Blackmun notes that the AMA adopted a policy favoring restrictive abortion laws in
1857 in order to protect “the independent and actual existence of the child before birth, as a
living being”71 and that the AMA revised its policy in 1970 in response to certain “changes in
state laws and by the judicial decisions which tend to make abortion more freely available.”72
Blackmun fails to note, however, that during the intervening period there was no change in the
medical conclusion that the victim of abortion is a living human being. The only change in
judgment was political in nature, not medical.
69
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Confronting a question which he insisted did not have an answer, Blackmun could then
assume a posture of judicial modesty. Indeed, by not speculating as to “this most sensitive and
difficult question”73 he could portray the Court as exercising restraint in the service of freedom.
The state, said Blackmun, could not restrict the pregnant woman’s freedom of choice “by
adopting one theory of life.”74 Employing Kurtz’s strategy, Blackmun sought to resolve the
matter by decisively acting “without judgment.”
There is, of course, nothing modest in pretending that science has not resolved the answer
to a particular scientific question when in fact it has. And there is nothing restrained in ignoring
the conclusions of the medical profession that represent the exercise of medical judgment simply
in order to reach a particular result. There is, however, something plainly ludicrous in
suggesting that a judge can decide a case without judging. Just as Kurtz’s jungle fighters
exercise judgment in their murderous use of violence, so the Court’s prohibition against adopting
a “theory of life” constitutes a judgment – a judgment that human life worthy of protection
begins only after birth, a judgment that under the Constitution one member of the human family
may be violently sacrificed at the altar of autonomy in order to vindicate the “dignity” of
another.
In declaring that the state must, as constitutional matter, ignore the humanity of the
victim subject to abortion, the Court in Roe abandoned both the principle of equal concern and
respect and the principle of ordered liberty in favor of the idea of liberty as license. This license,
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as Casey said, includes “the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and the mystery of human life,” even if the process of self-definition entails
extinguishing the life of another. Stenberg lays bare the full implications of this license. The
Stenberg court does not trouble itself with Roe’s fatuous claim that it “need not resolve the
difficult question of when life begins.” The majority knowsthat th e life at issue in the case has
already begun. Indeed, it is in the process of being born. By embracing what it believes is a
maximal conception of human freedom, the Court licenses the brutal killing of what is
undeniably an innocent human being. Turning its back on civilization, the Court marches
proudly into the jungle.
Accordingly, Stenberg makes apparent, as never before, the absurd contradiction that the
Court has placed at the foundation of our legal system. This absurdity derives from the fact that
the Court still routinely invokes the language of human dignity and the sanctity of human life.75
Indeed, these invocations appear scattered throughout the Court’s reported decisions. Thus, for
example, in striking down the Texas anti-sodomy statute in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court
informed us that it would “demean the[] existence” of homosexuals if the state could “control
their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”76 Likewise, the Court recently
held that the State of Hawaii could not limit those eligible to vote for a state-wide office to
75
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people of Hawaiian ancestry because “it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged
by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities.”77 Similarly, a generation
ago, in Cohen v. California the Court held that the state could not prosecute a man for wearing a
jacket emblazoned with the words “Fuck the Draft” because such a restriction on free expression
would not “comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political
system rests.”78
The point is not that these cases do not involve difficult questions of human dignity – of
freedom and equality. The point, instead, is that from the juxtaposition of these cases with
Stenberg we are led to believe that restrictions on speech, sexual conduct, and voting are
offensive to human dignity, but that human dignity is not at issue in the case of partial birth
abortion – or rather, that human dignity requires the state not to interfere with the brutal murder
of a child in the process of being born. Thus, although the language of human dignity, of equal
concern and respect, still lingers on in precedent, and the Court continues to mouth these words
in new decisions, the meaning of equality based on a common humanity is gone. When read
against the background of Stenberg v. Carhart, each of these references to human dignity can be
seen for what it is: a hollow declaration that decency and civility still reign, that barbarism does
not define us, that we are not in the jungle. Some people, however, can still read a map. The
unadorned facts that underlie Stenberg remind us where we are.
References to human dignity and the value of human life are especially common in the
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Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, and in particular its review of capital punishment.
Here, the Court has repeatedly set forth its belief that “[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less that the dignity of man.”79 Indeed, Justice William Brennan, perhaps
the most forceful proponent of this view, insisted that “[a] punishment is cruel and unusual . . . if
it does not comport with human dignity.”80 For Brennan, the “true significance” of such
“barbaric punishments” as the rack, the thumb-screw, and the death penalty itself “is that they
treat members of the human race as non-humans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded.”81
As such, these acts are “inconsistent with the fundamental premise” of our law “that even the
vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity.”82
During his tenure on the Court, Justice Brennan was an unwavering supporter of the
abortion license. Although it is surely to Brennan’s credit that he could still perceive the
fundamental human dignity of a violent criminal, it is more than a little ironic that, in the case of
abortion, he approved of the treatment of “members of the human race as non-humans, as objects
to be toyed with and discarded.” Beyond irony, it is absurd that our law acknowledges the
“common human dignity” of a violent criminal but refuses to recognize this same dignity in an
innocent child struggling to be born.
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This absurdity is even more pronounced when the holding in Stenberg is juxtaposed with
the panoply of federal and state efforts intended to extend the protection of law to unborn
children, to acknowledge them as members of the human family. It is absurd for the law to make
available to grieving parents a cause of action for wrongful death and loss of society for the
“death” of an unborn child caused by the negligence of another when the Supreme Court has
declared that it cannot resolve the difficult question of when “life” begins.83 It is absurd for the
law to allow for individuals to be prosecuted for homicide for deliberating causing the death of
an unborn child when Roe and its progeny allow a woman to pay her doctor to deliberately
exterminate the same child.84 If Stenberg is correct, if the unborn child has no legal standing up
to and including the time of birth, then it is difficult to make sense of federal statutes like the
Born-Alive Infants’ Protection Act,85 the Unborn Victims of Violence Act (“Laci and Conner’s
Law”),86 and similar measures.
In the Apocalypse Now, an American photojournalist and follower of Kurtz, played by
Dennis Hopper, remarks that the Colonel is “clear in his mind, but his soul is mad.” After
Stenberg, the same could truly be said of American law, without exaggeration. The freedom of
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the autonomous self to kill a child in the process of being born is not ordered liberty. It is the
disorder of liberty run amok. It embodies what Joseph Ratzinger recently referred to as “a
dictatorship of relativism that does not recognize anything as definitive and whose ultimate goal
consists solely of one’s own ego and desires.”87 Under this new regime, law is no longer the
rational ordering of human conduct in support of the common good.88 It is the triumph of the
strong over the weak. It is the legal extermination of certain members of the human species
deemed inconvenient by those in power.
As such, our law now embodies a kind of insanity. It is, as Willard says of Kurtz,
“broken up and ripped apart” on the inside, wavering toward collapse. The law is insane because
it cannot rationally affirm the dignity and equal worth of every human being and at the same
time sanction the intentional killing of an innocent human being in the name of freedom. Indeed,
in the hierarchy of values, human freedom cannot trump innocent human life since the right to
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life enjoys a kind of logical priority over every other right.89 The freedom to live is a necessary
condition to the enjoyment of every other kind of freedom, including the freedom to define the
meaning and mystery of human life extolled in Casey.
Moreover, the desire to maximize freedom cannot be the criterion by which a human
being is excluded from the protection of the law as a subject of equal concern and respect. Put
another way, the recognition of a human being as a legal person, as a rights-bearer, cannot be
contingent on the desire of someone else to act in a particular way.90 Ordered liberty demands
that we tolerate the inconvenience of other people.
Given humanity’s remarkable capacity for compartmentalization, rationalization and
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denial, the fundamental contradiction that now besets American law does not mean that the
collapse of our legal system is imminent.91 Even those who are insane, like Kurtz, can manage
to function fairly well day to day. But, if Stenberg is not reversed, its continued presence will
mark the solidification of a deep-seated intellectual incoherence in the law, an incoherence that
will have a corrosive effect on our legal system in myriad ways. Indeed, the longer we stay in
the jungle, the harder it will be to recall what authentic civilization looks like and to imagine how
it might be recovered.

* * *
At the beginning of the film, when Willard’s commanders first order him to kill Colonel
Kurtz, Willard is incredulous. He thinks he understands the order, but is uncertain. Could they
really mean for him to murder a fellow American? And so he asks for clarification: “Terminate
the Colonel?”
The current appeal to the Supreme Court of the three cases striking down the federal ban
on partial birth abortion92 permits us to do the same. It allows the American public to seek
clarification. Could the Court have really meant what it appeared to say in Stenberg v. Carhart?
Did the Court really mean to get out of the boat and wander into the jungle?
Specifically, this appeal allows the public to demand explicit answers to a number of
questions: Did the Court in Stenberg really mean to say that the humanity of the entity subject to
partial birth abortion is irrelevant to the question of whether it comes within the ambit of the

91

92

See note __, supra.
See note __, supra.

32

law’s protection? Did it really mean to say that the humanity of a child in the process of being
born is irrelevant to its status under the Constitution? If so, the American public deserves to
have that proposition stated with utter clarity.
Likewise, if the Court concedes that the victim of partial birth abortion is indeed a
“human being” but maintains that it is not a “person” under the Constitution,93 then the Court
must explain its criteria for constitutional personhood. Indeed, if the categories of “human
being” and “person” are not coextensive, then the Court must explain why that is the case since –
with the notable exception of slavery94 – our law has always regarded them as such. Because
law is a matter of public reason and not simply the expression of individual will, the language of
judges must be more honest and forthright than the euphemistic orders of military commanders
seeking to avoid the dictates of their own conscience. A judge may not avoid the dictates of the
law in order to reach a result that he or she deems desirable. If there are human beings who are
93
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not entitled to the protections afforded by legal personhood, then it is incumbent on the Court to
explain why this is so without ambiguity.
Throughout its abortion jurisprudence the Court has clearly struggled with its own
legitimacy in attempting to justify the nearly absolute right it created in Roe.95 Indeed, a
preoccupation with the Court’s status as the ultimate source of constitutional meaning – and not
the merits of the case – was largely responsible for the Court’s decision in Casey.96

Answering

the questions described above would require the Court to honestly confront the role it has
assumed within our republic and the sources of authority that make the exercise of that power
legitimate under the Constitution.
But honesty is always accompanied by risk. Fearful that a thorough and intellectually
honest response to these questions would expose the true nature of the Court’s decision, and
threaten the Court’s stature as an institution, Breyer and the other signators to Stenberg may
simply be incapable of this sort of candor. Still, no matter how awkward it might be for the
Justices to answer these questions in a manner free of obfuscation, it is not impertinent for us to
insist that they do so. The rule of law requires as much. Indeed, the rule of law not only requires
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the Court to answer these questions directly, it also requires the Court to demonstrate, as best it
can, that the Constitution demands the answers it puts forth.97
In Stenberg v. Carhart the Supreme Court “got out’a the fucking boat” and led us into the
jungle. With partial birth abortion once more before the Court, we again stand at the water’s
edge. The jungle lies only a few steps away, and seeing now only dimly the outlines and
shadows that mark it, the freedom it promises is powerfully enticing. Thus, the Court and the
people it serves must decide: Do we turn our backs on civilization and head further into the bush,
embracing the illusion of freedom in the barbarous license of state-sanctioned killing? Or do we
turn once more to recognize the fundamental dignity of every human being, the equal dignity
which informs ordered liberty and which makes authentic civilization possible? In pondering
our response, without a doubt, the best advice that can be had comes from a film about violence
and morality, candor and the tenuous nature of civilization: Never get out’a the boat!
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